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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper analyzes the case of a particular speech situation (medical 
interview) in which mitigating devices (Fraser, 1978 and 1980, and Fraser & 
Nolen, 1981), such as euphemisms, are used by a physician in order to 
deliver an AIDS prognosis to her patient. The use of the euphemism is 
intended to mitigate the force of a warning conveyed to the patient, such as a 
warning developing full-blown AIDS if the patient does not comply with the 
physician’s advice: start taking antiretroviral medication at once. As stressed 
by Fraser (1980: 342), mitigation is restricted to speech acts whose effects are 
“unwelcome to the hearer”. It is debated that the use of mitigation may not 
only be softening the illocutionary force (Holmes, 1984) of the warning but 
also, changing its strength to the extent of changing the illocutionary act1. In 
order words, the intended warning will not be understood as representing that 
speech act. If the analysis proves to be correct, it is argued that in the context 
of a chronic but fatal pandemic, such as HIV/AIDS, mitigation contributes to 
deceiving patients. It is called into question whether the intended inference   
–that of a warning– is really understood by the patient given her lack of 
education regarding the biological differences between being HIV infected 
and having AIDS (see interview in Appendix A). The implications of the use 
of mitigation in the context of a pandemic are discussed along with the 
potential medical consequences for the patient2.  
 
                                                 
1 “The illocutionary act (…) is a function of the meaning of the sentence”, Searle (1979: 64). Searle 
distinguishes twelve significant dimensions of variation in which illocutionary acts differ one from 
another. Among these dimensions, it is the force or strength with which the illocutionary point (or 
purpose) is presented. Another relevant dimension relevant to our study is the difference in the 
propositional content that is determined by the illocutionary force indicating devices (1979: 5-6). 
2 This paper can be considered a further analysis of the function of mitigation (see also Delbene, 
2004). 
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2. WARNING AND ADVICE AS RELATED SPEECH ACTS 
Let us consider the following created example as performed by a 
physician and a HIV/AIDS-infected patient: 
   
Example 1: 
Dado los resultados de carga viral y población linfoncitaria, en este momento 
usted corre riesgo de contraer una infección oportunística. Debo decirle que de 
no empezar con el tratamiento antiretroviral de inmediato, su situación puede 
evolucionar al estadio SIDA.  
 
The physician makes a clinical evaluation of the current health condition 
of the patient. Given the evaluation, a prediction is formulated, which 
simultaneously conveys a warning as well as advice about the future 
condition of the patient. Speaking a language is a matter of performing 
speech acts according to systems of constitutive rules (Searle, 1969). 
According to Searle (1969: 67), a warning is defined by the following rules: 
(i) Propositional content: Future event or state, e.g., “su situación puede 
evolucionar al estadio SIDA” meaning to reach the AIDS stage. (ii) 
Preparatory: (a) the hearer has reason to believe E will occur and is not in 
hearer’s interest, e.g., “Dado los resultados de carga viral y población 
linfocitaria, ud. corre riesgo de contraer una infección oportunística”, as well 
as the last part, “su situación puede evolucionar al estadio SIDA”. It is 
expected that the hearer will understand that the increase of the viral load will 
put her at risk of developing AIDS, and that is not in her best interests. 
Although, (b) it is not obvious to both speaker and hearer that E will occur. 
As a matter of fact, while an increase of the patient’s viral load will decrease 
her immune system defense, the evolution to AIDS disease still may not 
imminent. Some patients have different immune responses to the onset of the 
AIDS stage. (iii) Sincerity: speaker believes E is not in hearer’s best interest. 
In the case we discuss, the physician knows she needs to prevent the patient 
from AIDS because it is not in the patient’s best interest. (iv) Essential: 
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that E is not hearer’s best interest.  
Leech (1995: 23) distinguishes warning from advice in observing that in a 
warning, the future event as envisaged by the speaker is not in the interests of 
the hearer. On the contrary, an advice is envisaged in the interests of the 
hearer. However, as Leech (1995: 45) points out, Searle recognizes that there 
is a great deal of unclarity as to what counts as one kind of illocutionary act, 
and what counts as another. In order to provide a certain resolution to this 
discussion, at this stage, I consider that the physician’s prognosis constitutes 
both, advice and, also, a warning because the consequences of not following 
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the advice of “start taking the antiretroviral medication” are made explicit in 
example 1: “the evolution to the AIDS stage”. In section 7, we will return to 
the differences between these speech acts: advice and warning.  
3. VERBAL COMMUNICATION AND PLAGUES 
Mc Neill (1989: 26), a historian of plagues, observes that clear verbal 
communication among humans concerning infections and plagues has an 
“enormous survival value for human beings”. It is this aspect of our capacity 
to communicate with one another that has allowed Homo sapiens to become 
such a dominant species”. Pinker & Bloom (1990: 712) also observe, 
“Speech (…) allows access to a communal pool of knowledge, saving 
duplication of effort in trial-and-error direct discovery”. It is not in doubt that 
by means of verbal exchange, cooperative human behavior has contributed to 
human species’ survival and evolution. In this paper I call into question the 
cooperative function of mitigation in the context of a pandemic, its verbal 
contribution to fight against this modern plague, and discusses the social 
conflict that arises between delivering a warning on record (Brown & 
Levinson, 1987) and being polite.  
4. MITIGATION, ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE, AND DECEPTION 
In this section, we shall consider two ways of analyzing mitigation. First, 
we follow Fraser’s (1978 and 1980) traditional analysis that sees mitigation 
as a softening device of the illocutionary force with which a speech act is 
communicated. For that reason, we need to make reference to Searle (1976 
and 1979). Second, we analyze mitigation as drawing on Lakoff’s & 
Johnson’s (1980) analysis. 
According to Searle (1976 and 1979), one way of modifying the force, 
with which the illocutionary act is conveyed, is by explicit reference to a 
psychological state or sincerity condition. In the performance of any 
illocutionary act, the speaker expresses some attitude, state, etc. to that 
propositional content. Searle argues that this condition holds true even if the 
speaker is insincere and does not have the same belief, desire, intention, etc. 
Holmes (1984: 348) discusses two basic reasons for a speaker to modify the 
strength or force with which a particular speech act is expressed: first, “to 
convey modal meaning or the speaker’s attitude to the content of the 
proposition, and second, to express affective meaning or the speaker’s 
attitude to the addressee in the context of the utterance”. While the modal 
meaning concerns the speaker’s attitude, and commitment to the degree of 
certainty with respect to the propositional content asserted in the utterance, 
the affective meaning concerns the relationship of solidarity or distance that 
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the speaker wants to establish with her/his listener. In this paper, we shall 
consider both reasons in the context of a warning to prevent AIDS in a young 
woman.  
Lakoff & Johnson (1980) observe that in making a statement, we are 
selective, i.e., we focus on certain properties and downplay others. For that 
reason, every true statement necessarily leaves out what is hidden by the 
categories used in it. It is interesting to note that the process of mitigation 
shares some commonalties with the selective process that takes place with the 
use of metaphors. As a linguistic device that contributes to soften the effect 
of a locutionary act, mitigation involves indirectness (Fraser, 1980) and 
requires the use of either metaphorical or metonymical devices. Drawing on 
Lakoff’s & Johnson’s (1980) analysis, I suggest that the metaphorical 
selective process that downplays some categories but highlights others could 
be realized, in part, with the intention of achieving polite interactions. When 
mitigating devices are used, the selective process of highlighting some 
categories and downplaying others takes place. However, for the case of 
mitigation, which concerns us here, the selective process used by a speaker 
seems to be more problematic than that of enhancing the force of a speech 
act. As I see it, the problem lies in the fact that the same categories that have 
been chosen by the speaker to highlight the hearer’s cooperative associations 
can also, paradoxically, contribute to downplay and, therefore, blur the 
understanding of the message. Consequently, the metaphoric or metonymic 
effect could end up misleading the hearer. We will see this effect as 
illustrated in the interview (Appendix A) in section 6. 
The positive effects of mitigation have been traditionally seen as related 
to politeness (Brown & Levinson, 1987). For the purpose of my analysis, I 
will draw on Fraser’s (1990) notion of politeness as a socially anticipated 
contract between participants because he focuses on the speaker’s 
responsibility toward his/her hearer. As a matter of fact, Fraser (1990:      
232) argues that linguistic choices to achieve politeness are determined by 
“the speaker’s appreciation of a responsibility toward the hearer in the 
interaction”. The question that concerns us here in regard to the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic is how the speaker’s responsibility to warn others from developing 
AIDS should be expressed. Should the speaker mitigate the risk to preserve 
politeness, or be committed and speak out the danger? Are mitigation and the 
speaker’s social responsibility problematically compatible?  
5. DATA 
The interview analyzed in this paper presents the speech act of a warning 
and it was selected out of 34 (Appendix A) for that reason. All the interviews 
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were tape-recorded by myself in 1999 at a public hospital that specializes in 
infectious diseases in Montevideo, Uruguay. I was a participant observer 
during the interviews. The speech situation presents a seropositive patient 
who visits her physician for a check up. The patient is aware of her 
serostatus, but is not aware that she is at risk of developing AIDS: her CD T4 
cell count was 300 and her viral load was greater than 20.000 (RT-PCR) 
copies of HIV RNA/ml. Although the patient does not have any infectious 
disease at the moment of the interview, the level of her CD T4 indicates that 
she is in the onset of the AIDS stage and needs to initiate antiretroviral 
treatment, which will prevent her from getting any opportunistic infection 
associated with AIDS. Given the health condition of this young woman, the 
physician has to prescribe antiretroviral treatment and communicate such 
prognosis to the patient. This prognosis is translated as: being at risk of AIDS 
if antiretroviral therapy is not taken. The delivery of this prognosis can be 
considered unwelcome news, and unwelcoming prognoses are likely to be 
mitigated either due to altruistic intentions (Fraser, 1980) or to preserve the 
interactional management between the speakers (Caffi, 1999).  
An important reason for the selection of this interview is the resulting 
confusion expressed by the patient (turn 15) after listening to the physician’s 
prognosis (turns 12 and 14). The resulting confusion revolves around the 
term enfermarte (to get sick). “Yo tenía idea de que yo estaba enferma” as it 
is analyzed in detail in section 6. The patient’s confusion reveals that the 
physician’s warning was not perceived with that illocutionary force. 
Therefore, it triggers our analysis.  
6. ANALYSIS OF THE INTERVIEW 
According to Searle’s definition of warning discussed in section 2, the 
physician’s utterances in turns 12 and 14 (Appendix A) can be considered a 
warning (and advice). Most of the rules described by Searle seem to be 
involved. The physician knows that the patient will reach the AIDS stage if 
she does not take antiretroviral treatment immediately. It is also true that the 
physician cannot predict the imminence with which the patient will develop 
an infection associated with AIDS, but the patient will progress to the AIDS 
stage with certainty. The problem that we point out is that “AIDS” was never 
mentioned in such warning. If we compare the physician’s utterance (turn 12) 
“Estás en riesgo de enfermarte” with our created example 1 (see section 2), or 
with a second created utterance, for instance, (#12.a) “Estás en riesgo de 
evolucionar al SIDA” (You are at risk of developing AIDS), the following 
aspect can be observed: The first utterance (turn 12) is mitigated while the 
second (#12.a) is not. The expression enfermarte (getting sick) operates as a 
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euphemism that avoids mentioning AIDS, therefore it softens the 
illocutionary and perlocutionary effect that this utterance may have on the 
hearer. Utterance in turn 12 is likely to trigger a less negative and emotional 
reaction than being told, at risk of developing AIDS (#12.a). This is due to the 
social connotations of the word AIDS associated with suffering, 
stigmatization, loneliness, and ultimately death (Sontag, 1987). Therefore, 
politeness is involved in the selection of the euphemism instead of the real 
word, AIDS.  
All the rules as described by Searle (1969: 67) are achieved except for 
(iv) the “Essential: counts as an undertaking to the effect that E (in this case, 
AIDS disease) is not in the hearer’s (patient’s) best interest”. Mitigation, as 
realized by means of the euphemism, blurs the propositional content of the 
physician’s message. The expression en riesgo de enfermarte does not 
necessarily imply AIDS, and an uneducated patient may not make the 
inference. As a matter of fact, while AIDS entails being sick, being sick does 
not entail having AIDS. In other words, while HIV infection generally 
implies the developing of sickness involving AIDS, being seropositive does 
not necessarily imply having AIDS disease. This difference was not clear to 
the patient, who argues that she had the idea that she was already sick since 
she was aware of her positive serostatus.  
According to Levinson (1983: 167), entailments establish semantic and 
logical relationships. Levinson (1983: 174) states, “This relation 
[entailments] can be defined in terms of valid rules of inference, or 
alternatively in terms of the assignment of truth and falsity”. Consequently, 
inferring that being sick entails having AIDS is not true. For this reason, the 
physician’s mitigated expression enfermarte (sick) does not contribute to   
the clarity of the message. The consequence of this softening is that the 
utterance does not count as an undertaking to the effect that AIDS is not in 
the patient’s best interest. The patient may not realize the severe component 
of the preventive utterance since the physician did not put herself under the 
obligation to clearly express the risk or danger. Consequently, if the 
mitigating device, en riesgo de enfermarte blurs the propositional content of 
the utterance as analyzed above, then it can be expected that mitigation will 
also affect the illocutionary force of the warning. We observe that while the 
intended meaning of the physician’s utterances (turns 12 and 14) is to 
prevent, and therefore, to warn, the force with which the utterance is 
conveyed might have distorted the hearer’s inference. For example, the 
patient may understand the physician’s utterance mostly as advice, which 
does not necessarily involve a mandatory action, rather than as a warning      
–which does involve a mandatory action to be taken in order to prevent 
misfortune. The real danger to be prevented is not named but is indexed 
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through a metonymic device. Consequently, the illocutive force of the 
warning is vague. In my view, vagueness functions against the 
communicative intentions of warnings. Since the patient does not have a clear 
understanding of the full danger of her medical condition, then the 
physician’s utterance could be interpreted as simple advice to start taking 
antiretroviral treatment. Following the definition of warning in the dictionary 
as “to announce a danger, to caution about certain acts, to notify in advance” 
(Webster Dictionary, 1996), we conclude that while a warning involves 
advice, the latter differs from a warning in the degree of assertiveness that the 
speaker conveys as well as in the degree of danger involved that can be 
prevented. Certainly, that degree of assertiveness requires the commitment 
and engagement of the speaker in communicating the danger to be prevented. 
In sum, in this interview mitigation softened the illocutionary force of the 
speech act to the extent of unveiling the warning and making it, perhaps, 
advice. The speaker’s (physician’s) responsibility toward her hearer (patient) 
as claimed by Fraser (1990) is not entirely committed to the condition of 
truth, or to the sincerity condition required as an essential rule for the speech 
acts. Therefore, we also conclude that politeness was not followed because 
the contract between the speakers was violated. If mitigation blurs the 
message, then a patient who is uneducated about HIV/AIDS infection cannot 
develop a conscious awareness of her/his situation. In the next section, I 
discuss whether or not mitigation can affect speech acts’ condition of truth 
and if this is the case, what the bioethical implications would be.  
7. MITIGATION AND DECEPTION 
Addressing the philosophical problem of the nature of intentional states of 
the speech acts, Searle (1983) clearly links the intentional states with the 
sincerity condition that a speech act is supposedly to perform. For that 
reason, Searle (1983: 10) states that a lie (or other insincere speech act) 
“consists in performing a speech act, and thereby expressing an intentional 
state, where one does not have the intentional state that one expresses”. 
Moreover, Searle (1983) states that speech acts require a condition of truth, 
i.e., that the person’s psychological state expressed in the speech act, as well 
as the speech act condition of satisfaction have to be identical. In brief, a 
speech act requires a condition of truth along with a condition of satisfaction. 
By applying Searle’s theory to the analysis of the physician’s warning, we 
can re-think the analysis of the interview by saying that the warning 
conveyed to the patient will become indeed a warning if, and only if, it is a 
fact that the patient’s need of starting the treatment is true. According to the 
medical literature concerning the HIV/AIDS infection that statement is true 
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(Pennsylvania AIDS Education and Training Center, 1999): the patient needs 
to start taking the antiretroviral treatment. Regarding the condition of 
satisfaction, this one was also fulfilled: the physician’s warning became 
indeed a warning since the patient started taking the antiretroviral treatment. 
In other words, the warning seems to be fulfilled when the patient 
accomplished the beginning of the treatment. However, I pose the following 
question: Does the patient really initiate the antiretroviral treatment because 
she is aware of her risk of developing AIDS? The formulation of this question 
has the purpose to discern whether it is the case that the patient took the 
medication because her physician prescribed that to her or because the patient 
became aware of her risk of developing AIDS. As discussed above, a 
warning involves naming the risk or danger that is about to come. It also 
requires a mandatory action be taken. By naming the risk, people become 
aware, alert, and conscious of what is to come. By being aware, people can 
take control of their lives. Since mitigation, metonymically softens the 
severity of the AIDS prognosis with a general name that functions as a 
euphemism, I argue that the patient was not, indeed, warned given the 
modification of the speech act achieved by the euphemism. Therefore,        
the physician’s apparent warning does not fulfill the condition of satisfaction. 
The different meaning between the use of a mitigated device and naming the 
problem can be observed in the individual and social awareness that the 
naming the problem implies.  
In addition, mitigation alters the propositional content of the utterance. 
The modification is observed in the fact that being sick shares some 
denotations with having AIDS but not all of them; for example, while being 
sick may not be fatal, AIDS is. The speaker’s selection of the categories 
involved in the word sick is not relevant enough to warn, i.e., to convey the 
relevant information that makes the person aware of the future adversity and 
to take preventative measures against it. This selective procedure is, 
therefore, similar to that of metaphors as observed by Lakoff & Johnson 
(1980: 10): “The very systematicity that allows us to comprehend one aspect 
of a concept in terms of another (e.g., comprehending an aspect of arguing in 
terms of battle) will necessarily hide other aspects of the concept”. For this 
reason, I conclude that in this context specially characterized by a pandemic, 
mitigation contributes to deception.  
8. CONCLUSION 
The deceptive mechanism of mitigation lies in the downplaying of the 
most relevant category (the prevention of AIDS) by the speaker’s ability to 
highlight other categories that are not as relevant, but seem to be interactively 
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relevant. As mentioned above, it is true that the patient has to be prevented 
from getting sick since AIDS entails sickness, but paradoxically and, at the 
same time, the message is also deceptive since sickness does not entail AIDS. 
Also, it is discussed that the effect of softening the warning, by means of the 
euphemism enfermarte, weakens the force with which the illocutionary act is 
expressed. Therefore, mitigation may change the illocutionary act or purpose 
of the speech act, i.e., that of warning. Because the real danger to be 
prevented, AIDS, is never mentioned, the utterance (turn 12, 14) could        
be interpreted as an advice. The strongest difference between advice and 
warning as discussed, is that the latter requires the speaker’s commitment to 
communicate the danger or risk along with a mandatory action on the hearer 
to prevent that danger. As a final conclusion, we say that while politeness 
entails a cooperative behavior, the reverse is not always true, especially, in 
the context of a pandemic. This study requires the examination of other 
speech situations to triangulate our analysis.  
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10. APPENDIX A 
12D: Tenemos que tomar medidas para evitar que te enfermes. Porque estás 
con un nivel de defensas BAJO y estás EN RIESGO de enfermarte, 
¿sabés?  
12D: We have to take some measures to prevent you from getting sick. 
Because you have a LOW, level of defenses and you are AT RISK of 
getting sick, you know?  
13P: Bueno 
13P: OK. 
14D: Tal vez, no pase nada pero estás en riesgo de enfermarte y nosotros 
tenemos que tomar medidas para que no te enfermes.  
14D: Perhaps, nothing will happen but you are at risk of getting sick and we 
have to take some measures to prevent you from getting sick. 
15P: Yo tenía la idea de que yo estaba enferma ^= 
15P: I had the idea that I was sick= ^ 
16D: =Vos, en este momento, no estás enfErma= 
16D: =You, in this moment, you are not sIck = 
17P: Sí (confused and denying the doctor’s statement) 
17P:  Yes  
18D:  No estás haciendo fiEbre ^=  
18D: You aren’t getting any fEver^= 
19P: No, no.= 
19P:  No, no = 
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20D: =Diarrea, adelgazamiento, tampoco. Este, entonces tenemos que 
tratar de que las cosas SIGAN así. Por eso tenemos que prevenir en 
este momento. Bueno, Y, cuando hablamos de intervenir, hablamos 
de, de la posibilidad de un tratamiento. ¿Entendés lo que es un 
tratamiento? 
20D:  =Diarrhea, neither, weight loss. So, then we have to try to KEEP 
things like now. That’s why we have to prevent [you from getting 
sick] right now. Well, AND, when we talk about intervening, we are 
talking about, about the possibility of a [medical] treatment [plan]. Do 
you understand what a [medical] treatment [plan] is?  
21P: Sí, de medicamentos.  
21P: Yes, [a treatment] of medicines. 
22D:  Si, claro. Y:: ¿estás dispuesta a hacerlo? 
22D:  Yes, of course. A::nd, are you willing to do it? 
